Land Acquisition

Acquired Land Lying Unused for Decades: Can the Owner Get It Back, and Can the State Give It to Another Project?

By Shashank Shri Tripathi, AdvNovember 15, 202613 min read
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Land acquired decades ago is still lying vacant, or is being given to a project other than the one in the notification. Can the owner get it back? This article explains the vesting rule after the Constitution Bench in Indore Development Authority (2020), the Supreme Court's 2026 ruling in Dharmalingam, and the exceptions: fraud on power, urgency acquisitions left unused, and Sections 99, 101 and 102 of the 2013 Act.

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On 10 March 2026 the Supreme Court set aside two judgments of the Madras High Court that had ordered the State to hand back land acquired in the 1980s, part of which had remained unused for many years. The High Court had treated the long non-use as a reason for return. The Supreme Court called that reasoning unknown to land acquisition law, held that no timeline can be imposed on the Government for putting acquired land to use, and upheld the State's decision to use the vacant part for a different public purpose (Chennai Metropolitan Development Authority v. Dharmalingam, 2026 INSC 269). It was the latest in a line that runs through the Constitution Bench judgment written by Justice Arun Mishra in Indore Development Authority v. Manoharlal on 6 March 2020.

Owners in Uttar Pradesh ask the same two questions about such land: the project was completed decades ago and part of my land is still lying empty, can I get it back; and the notification said the land was for one project, can the State now give it to another? This article makes two points, on the law as it stands on 15 November 2026. First, for land acquired under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, the answer to both questions largely favours the State: once possession is taken the land vests in it absolutely, non-use creates no right of return, and the land may be used for a different public purpose. Second, the rule has edges, and they are where an owner's real case lies: a diversion for private benefit, an urgency acquisition in which possession was not lawfully taken and the land then lay unused, a five-year rule for development-authority land in Uttar Pradesh, and acquisitions under the 2013 Act, which treat change of purpose and unused land quite differently.

Vesting: why the State is in so strong a position

Under Section 16 of the 1894 Act, when the Collector has made the award and takes possession, the land vests absolutely in the Government free from all encumbrances. From that moment the former owner has no title left. What he has is a right to compensation, and, if he disputes the amount, a reference.

The Supreme Court has drawn the consequence many times. In Gulam Mustafa v. State of Maharashtra (decided 18 September 1975, AIR 1977 SC 448), the Court held that once the original acquisition is valid and title has vested, how the authority uses the excess land is no concern of the original owner and cannot be a ground for invalidating the acquisition. In State of Kerala v. M. Bhaskaran Pillai ((1997) 5 SCC 432), land acquired for one public purpose and not needed for it could be used for another public purpose, and if it was not needed at all, the right course was a public auction, not a sale back to the former owner. V. Chandrasekaran v. Administrative Officer ((2012) 12 SCC 133) said that land once acquired cannot be restored even if it is not used for the purpose for which it was acquired.

The 2020 Constitution Bench

Indore Development Authority v. Manoharlal ((2020) 8 SCC 129, decided 6 March 2020) is usually remembered for Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act, the provision under which some old acquisitions were said to have lapsed. The five-judge Bench, in a judgment written by Justice Arun Mishra, held that an acquisition lapses under that section only where the authorities have neither taken possession nor paid compensation; if either has been done, there is no lapse. That closed the route by which many owners of long-unused land had tried to recover it.

The same judgment restated the vesting rule in terms that are now quoted in almost every case on unused land. At paragraph 256 the Constitution Bench said that once land has been acquired, it cannot be restored to the tenure-holders or persons interested "even if it is not used for the purpose for which it is so acquired". Being a Constitution Bench, it binds every smaller Bench and every High Court.

Two later decisions applied it to the questions owners actually ask. In Nandkishor Babulal Agrawal v. State of Maharashtra (order dated 10 November 2023), the Supreme Court said that "there cannot be a time limit within which the authorities are expected to utilize the acquired land" and that the public purpose of an acquisition can be changed at a later stage, provided the land is used for a public purpose. In Dharmalingam (2026) the Court adopted both statements (paragraphs 14 and 15), held that there is no legal bar against keeping a portion of acquired land vacant (paragraph 17), and held that an owner's request for reconveyance does not take away the State's power to revisit the original public purpose (paragraph 18).

"Can the land be given to another project when the Section 4 and Section 6 notifications gave a different purpose?"

For an 1894 Act acquisition, yes, if the new use is also a public purpose. Gulam Mustafa, Bhaskaran Pillai and Dharmalingam all accept that the purpose stated in the notifications does not freeze the land's future use. Dharmalingam itself concerned land acquired for an inter-city bus terminal, the vacant part of which was later earmarked for a truck parking yard and for relocating merchants; the Court treated that as a valid public use.

The counter-argument, stated fairly

Let us assume, for the purposes of argument, that a farmer's land was taken in 1985 for a specific scheme. He was paid the compensation of 1985. The scheme was built on half the area; his half has stood vacant for forty years, and the authority now proposes to give it to a different project, or to auction it at today's value. He gave up his land for a stated public need that, as to his part, never arose. Article 300A says no person shall be deprived of property save by authority of law, and the authority of law was a notification naming one purpose.

The answer of the Constitution Bench is that the deprivation was complete and lawful when the land vested in 1985, and that Article 300A was satisfied by the acquisition and the compensation, not by the later use. On that view, what happens afterwards is the State's management of its own property, reviewable only like any other State action. The argument is not frivolous, and the Supreme Court has never said it is. It has said that the remedy lies elsewhere: in challenging the acquisition itself where it was not genuine, or in the statutory protections that Parliament later wrote into the 2013 Act.

Where the rule stops

A diversion for private benefit

Vesting protects a genuine acquisition. It does not protect a fraud. In Royal Orchid Hotels Ltd. v. G. Jayarama Reddy ((2011) 10 SCC 608, decided 29 September 2011), land acquired for a public purpose was transferred to private parties for a hotel and golf project, and the Supreme Court upheld the quashing of the acquisition as a fraud on power. In N. Arasappa v. State of Karnataka (2026 INSC 1151, decided 26 October 2026), land near Bangalore had been notified in 1988 for a cooperative society's housing scheme, under an arrangement the society had made in 1984 with a third party to get land acquired through the government machinery. The owners came to court only in 2007. The Supreme Court held that established fraud and colourable exercise of power cannot be protected by delay or by earlier litigation, and directed that possession be restored to the landowners, whether or not they had challenged the acquisition, on refunding without interest the compensation they had received from the Government; the society was left with no claim to the land (paragraphs 71 and 74).

The difference between Dharmalingam and Arasappa is the difference between a change of public purpose and a disguised private purpose. A vacant plot later used for a school, a road or a depot is the first. Land acquired for a public scheme and passed, in substance, to a builder or a private company, particularly where the diversion was planned from the start, may be the second. That case is hard to prove and depends on documents, but it is the one in which delay is not fatal.

Urgency followed by years of non-use

Dharmalingam noted one exception to the rule that no timeline can be imposed: cases in which the urgency clause in Section 17 of the 1894 Act was invoked (paragraph 14). Urgency was the reason for denying the owner a hearing on his objections under Section 5-A. Land that then lies unused for years undermines the justification for that denial.

The Allahabad High Court at Lucknow went further in Mata Baksh Singh v. State of U.P. (decided 24 February 2026, a Division Bench of Sangeeta Chandra and Brij Raj Singh, JJ.). Land in Raebareli had been acquired under the urgency clause in 2006-07 for a residential colony. Part of it was later shown in a revised layout as reserved "for future planning", carved out as a commercial plot and auctioned in 2023. The Bench held the invocation of the urgency clause to be arbitrary (paragraph 33), and held that reservation for future planning, without actual development or use, does not amount to utilisation (paragraphs 34 to 37).

The decisive step was this. Where urgency is invoked, Section 17(3-A) of the 1894 Act requires the Collector to tender eighty per cent of the estimated compensation before taking possession. That had not been done, and the Court held that possession taken without it could not vest lawful ownership in the State. On that footing it distinguished Indore Development Authority as a decision on Section 24 of the 2013 Act (paragraph 91), held that the refusal to restore the land was "arbitrary and violative of Articles 14 and 300-A" (paragraph 96), quashed the auction and allotment of the plot so far as they concerned the petitioner's land, and directed that possession be restored to him (paragraph 104).

A five-year rule in Uttar Pradesh: Section 17 of the 1973 Act

Mata Baksh Singh also shows the one five-year rule that land acquired for a development authority in Uttar Pradesh can draw on under the old regime. The Court read the proviso to Section 17 of the U.P. Urban Planning and Development Act, 1973 as giving the owner a substantive right to seek restoration where the land has not been utilised for five years, on depositing the acquisition charges with twelve per cent interest, and ordered restoration on those terms (paragraphs 84 and 104). The purchaser at the auction was to be refunded with interest. The provision is narrow: in Sumit Makhija (below) the High Court held that Section 17 of the 1973 Act applies only to land acquired under that Act, so it does not help with land taken for other departments or under other statutes. This article has not traced any appeal against Mata Baksh Singh.

Release before possession, and the danger of a release obtained on wrong facts

Section 48 of the 1894 Act lets the Government withdraw from an acquisition only before possession is taken. After vesting, a release is not a matter of right, and a release obtained on wrong facts will not stand. In Sumit Makhija v. State of U.P. (2026 LiveLaw (AB) 898, reported 30 October 2026), land in Kanpur Nagar acquired in 1959 had been released in 2006 on a District Magistrate's report that possession was never taken and the scheme never executed. The release was recalled. The High Court found those statements incorrect, upheld the recall although the statute gave no express power to recall, because the order had been obtained by misrepresentation, and dismissed the petition with costs of ₹5 lakh.

If the land was acquired under the 2013 Act

Parliament answered the counter-argument above, for future acquisitions, in Chapter XIII of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013.

• Section 99: no change from the purpose or related purposes for which the land was originally sought to be acquired is allowed. The only exception is where the land has become unusable for that purpose because of a fundamental change due to unforeseen circumstances; the Government may then use it for another public purpose.

• Section 101: land acquired under the 2013 Act which remains unutilised for five years from the date of taking possession is to be returned to the original owners or their heirs, or to the State's land bank. The Supreme Court held in Ultra-Tech Cement v. Mast Ram (2024 INSC 709) that both conditions must be met, and that land serving the purpose of the acquisition, such as a safety zone, is not unutilised.

• Section 102: where land acquired under the Act is transferred to any person for consideration without any development having taken place on it, forty per cent of the appreciated land value is to be shared among the persons from whom it was acquired or their heirs, in proportion to the value at which it was acquired; the benefit applies to transfers within five years of the acquisition and only to the first sale.

These sections are written for land "acquired under this Act". High Courts have declined to apply Section 101 to acquisitions completed under the 1894 Act; the Telangana High Court did so in Writ Appeal No. 643 of 2022. For an owner, the first question is therefore which Act his land was taken under, and the answer is in the notification and the award, not in the date of the project.

What to look at before deciding whether there is a case

• The notifications: the dates and stated purpose of the Section 4 and Section 6 notifications, and whether urgency under Section 17 was invoked.

• The award and possession: the date of the award, the date and record of possession (the possession memo), and whether compensation was paid or deposited.

• The present use: what the land is being used for now, who holds it, and on what terms, including any lease or sale to a private party.

• The decision to change: the order or board resolution under which the land was re-allotted, and whether the new use is a public one.

Conclusion

For an owner whose land was taken under the 1894 Act and is now lying vacant, the law after Indore Development Authority is plain, and it is against him: the land vested when possession was taken, non-use for any length of time does not bring it back, and the State may put it to another public use. A claim built only on the passage of years, or on the difference between the notification's purpose and today's use, will fail.

The cases that succeed are of a different kind. They show that the land was not acquired for a genuine public purpose at all, or that an urgency acquisition was followed by years of idleness and a sale, or that the land was taken under the 2013 Act, whose Sections 99, 101 and 102 give the owner rights that the 1894 Act never did. In Uttar Pradesh there is also, for development-authority land, the five-year proviso to Section 17 of the 1973 Act, and the question whether possession under the urgency clause was lawfully taken at all. The open question, after Dharmalingam's reference to urgency, is how far the courts will go in reviewing old urgency acquisitions where the land was never used. The answer will come from facts like those of Mata Baksh Singh, and the owner who keeps the notification, the possession memo and the record of every later transfer will be the one in a position to ask it.

Key Authorities Cited

  • Indore Development Authority v. ManoharlalSupreme Court of India (Constitution Bench), 2020-03-06(2020) 8 SCC 129; [2020] 3 S.C.R. 1Paras: 256
  • Chennai Metropolitan Development Authority v. DharmalingamSupreme Court of India, 2026-03-102026 INSC 269Paras: 14, 15, 17, 18
  • Nandkishor Babulal Agrawal v. State of MaharashtraSupreme Court of India, 2023-11-10Order dated 10 November 2023
  • Gulam Mustafa v. State of MaharashtraSupreme Court of India, 1975-09-18AIR 1977 SC 448
  • State of Kerala v. M. Bhaskaran PillaiSupreme Court of India(1997) 5 SCC 432
  • V. Chandrasekaran v. Administrative OfficerSupreme Court of India(2012) 12 SCC 133
  • M/s Royal Orchid Hotels Ltd. v. G. Jayarama ReddySupreme Court of India, 2011-09-29(2011) 10 SCC 608
  • N. Arasappa v. State of KarnatakaSupreme Court of India, 2026-10-262026 INSC 1151Paras: 71, 74
  • Mata Baksh Singh v. State of U.P.Allahabad High Court (Lucknow Bench), 2026-02-24Writ-C No. 2000170 of 2015Paras: 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 84, 91, 96, 104
  • Sumit Makhija v. State of U.P.Allahabad High Court2026 LiveLaw (AB) 898
  • M/s Ultra-Tech Cement Ltd. v. Mast RamSupreme Court of India, 2024-09-202024 INSC 709

Statutory Provisions

  • Land Acquisition Act, 1894 - Section 16 (vesting on possession), Section 17 including Section 17(3-A) (urgency; tender of eighty per cent before possession) and Section 48 (withdrawal before possession)
  • U.P. Urban Planning and Development Act, 1973 - Section 17, proviso (restoration of land not utilised for five years)
  • Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 - Section 24(2) (lapse of old acquisitions)
  • Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 - Section 99 (bar on change of purpose), Section 101 (return of unutilised land) and Section 102 (sharing of appreciated value)
  • Constitution of India - Article 300A (right to property)

Frequently Asked Questions

My land was acquired in the 1980s and part of it is still vacant. Can I get it back?

Ordinarily, no. Once possession was taken, the land vested in the State under Section 16 of the 1894 Act, and the Supreme Court (Indore Development Authority, 2020, and Dharmalingam, 2026) has held that non-use, for however long, does not give the former owner a right to have it returned.

The notification said the land was for one scheme. Can the government use it for something else?

For an acquisition under the 1894 Act, yes, if the new use is also a public purpose. A transfer that is in substance for a private party's benefit stands differently and can be challenged as a fraud on power.

Is there any time limit within which the authority must use acquired land?

Not for completed 1894 Act acquisitions; the Supreme Court has said no time limit can be imposed. Dharmalingam noted an exception where the urgency clause was invoked. For land acquired under the 2013 Act, Section 101 provides for return of land that remains unutilised for five years from possession, and in Uttar Pradesh the proviso to Section 17 of the U.P. Urban Planning and Development Act, 1973, as read in Mata Baksh Singh (2026), allows a claim for restoration of development-authority land unutilised for five years, on deposit of the acquisition charges with interest.

The authority has auctioned the unused part of my acquired land to a private buyer. Do I have any remedy?

It depends on the facts. Under the 2013 Act, Section 102 gives former owners a share of the appreciated value on certain transfers without development. Under the 1894 Act, the Allahabad High Court in Mata Baksh Singh (2026) quashed the auction of a plot carved out of land acquired under the urgency clause and kept only for future planning, and ordered possession restored to the owner, because the eighty per cent compensation required before urgency possession had not been tendered. Where the acquisition itself was a cover for private benefit, the Supreme Court in Arasappa (2026) ordered restoration of possession.

Does Section 101 of the 2013 Act help if my land was acquired under the old 1894 Act?

Generally not. Section 101 speaks of land acquired under the 2013 Act, and High Courts have declined to apply it to acquisitions completed under the 1894 Act.

Can the government release land back to me on my application?

Section 48 of the 1894 Act allows withdrawal only before possession is taken. After vesting, release is not a right, and a release based on incorrect facts can be recalled, as in Sumit Makhija (2026), where the Allahabad High Court also imposed costs of ₹5 lakh.

Advocate Shashank Shri Tripathi
About the AuthorShashank Shri Tripathi, Advocate

Shri Law Chambers. Practises before the Supreme Court of India and in tribunal matters, including the Armed Forces Tribunal and the NCLT.

Enrolled with the Bar Council of Uttar Pradesh, 2019 · Advocate-on-Record, Allahabad High Court · Allahabad High Court Bar Association

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